THE DISSOLUTION OF AUTONOMOUS CONSTITUTIONAL BODIES IN THE MEXICAN STATE (2018–2030): JUSTIFICATION OR CONSOLIDATION OF POWER?

Abstract

The institutional configuration of the Mexican State has been reshaped under the political projects inaugurated by President Andrés Manuel López Obrador in 2018 and continued under President Claudia Sheinbaum Pardo. Within this new framework, the viability of several Autonomous Constitutional Bodies has been contested, particularly on grounds of their financial cost, their degree of social legitimacy, and their functional effectiveness. These critiques have provided the rationale for the dismantling of such bodies.

A central question arises: whether their dissolution can be normatively justified, or whether such measures should be understood as a concentration of power in the executive branch through the reassignment of their functions. This invites a broader inquiry into the proper delineation of tasks that should remain within the remit of the traditional branches of government—especially the executive—and those that ought to remain insulated from direct political control, most notably responsibilities related to the protection of human rights.